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ABSTRACT
Data protection has long been a point of contention and a vastly researched eld.
With the advent of technology and advances in Internet technologies, securing data
has become much more challenging these days. Cloud services have become very
popular. Given the ease of access and availability of the systems, it is not easy to
not use cloud to store data. This however, pose a signicant risk to data security
as more of your data is available to a third party. Given the easy transmission and
almost innite storage of data, securing one's sensitive information has become a
major challenge.
Cloud service providers may not be trusted completely with your data. It is not
very uncommon to snoop over the data for nding interesting patterns to generate
ad revenue or divulge your information to a third party, e.g. government and law
enforcing agencies. For enterprises who use cloud service, it pose a risk for their
intellectual property and business secrets. With more and more employees using
cloud for their day to day work, business now face a risk of losing or leaking out
information.
In this thesis, I have focused on ways to protect data and information over cloud-
a third party not authorized to use your data, all this while still utilizing cloud
services for transfer and availability of data. This research proposes an alternative
to an on-premise secure infrastructure giving exibility to user for protecting the
data and control over it. The project uses cryptography to protect data and create
a secure architecture for secret key migration in order to decrypt the data securely
for the intended recipient. It utilizes Intel's Identity protection technology (IPT)
with Public key Infrastructure (PKI) for providing a hardened security which gives
an added advantage over other existing solutions.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Data protection has long been a point of contention and a vastly researched eld.
It has been a need before the invention of rst cipher in the history. Civilizations used
various techniques to transmit message securely. With time the medium has changed
but the requirement is still as critical as it was before. Today, in the digital age, we
not only create data at a superuous rate we also store, share and transmit a lot of
data. According to Alphabet CEO Eric Schmidt, each day we generate as much data
as we did from the start of civilization up to 2003 [70]. This gives an idea about the
scale of information we produce which is accessible to people. A major portion of
which could be sensitive or private. Once a piece of information is digital it is not easy
to contain it to yourself or the intended audience. Data over the Internet is accessible
to people whom we do not know about and are snooping over our information. With
the advent of large server farms and innite data storage, storing multiple copies of
your data at many location is not very uncommon. Though it has its benets, it
raises concerns among users and businesses. Documents which are not meant to be
public, remain susceptible to attacks when there are multiple copies of it.
In recent years we have witnessed an explosive growth in cloud related technologies
where users can access the services on a rental or temporary basis. Cloud services
have been rising in popularity signicantly as it provides a cost eective and highly
available model of fullling the computing needs for a personal user or an enterprise.
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It is more appealing, given the ease of access and availability of the systems but they
do pose a signicant risk to your data.
However, usage of cloud storage systems increases the risk many fold as there
are not just multiple copies now- to increase the availability of your data from any-
where quickly, there is also a third party involved which has control over your data.
Cloud service providers may not be trusted completely with your data. It is not
very uncommon to snoop over the data for nding interesting patterns to generate
ad revenue, or divulging your information to a third party e.g. government and law
enforcing agencies. In a recent report by electronic frontier education [66], out of
the 24 companies evaluated, only fteen even notied the users about disclosing their
data to government agencies. An interesting thing to note is that this report is an
improvement from past years. Surely, Silicon Valley is taking up the privacy issue
seriously but for more protection user should step up and take the task of securing
the data in their hands.
1.2 Problem Statement
Cloud operates in three service models: software as service (SaaS), platform as
service (PaaS) and infrastructure as service (IaaS). There are various security concerns
regarding cloud usage, e.g. privacy, user control, etc. which are discussed in detail in
[73] and briey later in this manuscript. In a traditional on-premise application, data
is stored within the enterprise boundary. However, with the usage of cloud service
models, data is sent outside this secure periphery for computing or storage. This
poses a risk for the enterprise as they do not have control over the data. This work
focuses on data storage over the cloud. Using cloud services for le storage gives
a lot of benet but comes at an added risk. Service providers operate on multiple
geographies and come under dierent laws, and under certain regulations they might
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even have to disclose the documents they have stored on the server. This - in case,
cloud is trustworthy and has no motivation to access your data. For large enterprises,
this may not be a viable way since company documents may contain intellectual
property and business secrets. There are multiple concerns with cloud data storage
as discussed in [44], [63], [62]. These include, but not limited to:
1. Privacy
2. Lack of user control
3. Security
4. Trust issues
5. Legal aspects
This thesis targets to resolve the issues faced in data storage on the cloud.
1.3 Existing Solution
Traditionally, security for an enterprise meant accessing the data in a restricted
environment which can be controlled or regulated by IT department. Thus rewalls,
intrusion defense systems were able to resolve the security issues. However, computing
in cloud does not let your traditional security measures be as eective as they were
before. One needs to revamp the security measures for cloud computing. There
have been eorts to address the issues arising due to usage of cloud, but most of
them focus on on-premise cloud which is expensive and dicult to maintain and
only large companies can aord it. Hwang and Li [56] propose a method to use
a trust-overlay network across multiple data centers to establish trust between the
business and the cloud. This however assumes cloud is not an adversary and can not
be forced/motivated to leak the data it stores. Shen and Tong, in their work [69]
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realized the need of trusted computing for a secure cloud storage. Chow, Golle, et
al. [50] in their survey also found trusted computing for cloud data protection to be
a better alternative.
There are solutions available to mitigate the concerns discussed before. One of
them is encrypted cloud, where the data is stored in an encrypted form. Products
like CipherCLoud [17], Boxcryptor [14], BetterCloud [13] provide these facilities. This
enables the user to store the document in such a way that only the intended recipient
or the owner be able to utilize the data. However, the key to the data is not controlled
by the user/enterprise. For a enterprise, this pose a problem when an employee leaves
the company and it has to reach out to cloud service provider (CSP) to let them have
access to employees documents, making them dependent on CSPs.
There have been eorts in giving the security of users data in user's hand but most
of them have the problem with the storage of key. A technique to provide protection
over cloud is discussed in [74] and provides the protection from cloud. However it
does not addresses the lack of trusted computing and is prone to attacks. Products
like Boxcryptor [14] also provide similar functionality but store the key on the system
and are susceptible to a malware intrusion. Other solutions, e.g BetterCloud [13],
CipherCloud [17], which aim at protecting data over cloud but lack trusted computing
integration are much prone to attacks than a trusted computing based solution.
This research at Intel overcomes these limitations by making use of Intel's rmware
based key encryption where the key is exposed only in a secure environment. This
hardens the security of the system and almost nullies malware or any software based
attacks. Intel Identity Protection Technology (Intel IPT) [7] with Public key infras-
tructure (PKI) is a second factor authentication for business and web services that
validates when a legitimate user, not malware, is logging in from a trusted PC. This
technology is available on 3rd generation and higher Intel Core vPro processors [7].
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It utilizes Intel Management Engine (Intel ME) to provide a trusted measure for
authentication. Intel ME lets one save certicates on a system which can be used
to authenticate and provide hardened security features. The research also proposes
a scheme to keep the key to the document under user/enterprise control and make
them independent of the service provider.
1.4 Overview
This research focuses on security challenges faced by enterprises and users in
general by utilizing cloud for storing their data. For enterprises, the traditional model
of on-premise security has not been very eective to prevent data thefts [6]. With
increased usage of cloud services by employees, this risk has become more widespread
and there is a need to protect documents at a more granular level instead of the
traditional barrier security.
This work focuses on analyzing the existing research for the above problems along
with the concerns regarding the ownership and control of the secured data. It aims at
giving control of security in the hands of enterprises instead of trusting a third party,
in a way which is feasible and is an improvement over the existing solutions. The
research comes up with a way to securely protect the document and have the security
in control of the enterprise by giving them control over their key. This research focuses
on two important aspects:
1. Protecting data on the disk
Researching on ways to prevent the data stored on the local system from being
accessed by the CSP [65]. The aim is to have control and secure the data before
it is accessible to the CSP on local system. A brief overview is depicted in 1.1.
The user operations on le are captured by a le system lter diver [40] which
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Figure 1.1: Protecting data on the disk
interacts with IPT-PKI for key management and encrypts the le at run-time
and stores in the hard disk. This prevents the CSP to intercept the data in
plain text and only uploads encrypted content to the cloud.
2. Key control and secure migration
Having the data restricted from cloud is not enough since the mobility of data
is required. This aspect of the research aims to transfer encrypted data to cloud
and keep the key to secured documents in enterprise's control. A central and
highly secured server is required for key management which is responsible for
user authentication and exporting or importing the keys.
Figure 1.2 gives an overview of the approach that has been used to protect the
data from cloud and key migration to provide the needed mobility. My approach
utilizes Intel's technology for key protection on the local system, providing a hardened
security feature. This provides an improvement over other previous work which lacked
hardware based security for user authentication and malware protection.
The structure of the document is as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of cloud
computing and why security is an issue. It also present statistics about enterprises
being at increased risk due to cloud services. Chapter 3 discuss the role of cryptogra-
6
Figure 1.2: Overview of Data Protection approach
phy and evaluate cryptography algorithms which are suited for the project. Chapter
4 discuss the realization of the architecture and data protection approach. 5 discuss
the implementation detail and evaluation of the proof of concept developed. The
thesis concludes with discussion on further work in the area in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
CLOUD COMPUTING AND SECURITY
As discussed in Chapter 1, data over cloud raises many security concerns and has
implications which may not be apparent immediately. With all the benets and
exibility a cloud computing services provide, it comes with its own risk and privacy.
In this chapter, I give a brief overview of cloud service and describe the security risks
faced by an individual or organization by storing data over cloud and its implications.
I will also present how common the attacks on data have become in recent times and
the impact malicious attackers have on the community as a whole.
2.1 Cloud Computing
This section gives a brief overview of cloud service model and how it has changed
the industry and way people use and process digital content. Cloud computing is
model which lets a user access various shared services on demand and with minimal
management eorts. Concept of cloud service is not a new one, it has been in use
since the early origins of computing. The idea of cloud computing was supposedly
introduced by J. C. R. Licklider while developing ARPANET (Advanced Research
Projects Agency Network) in 1969, to connect people and data anytime anywhere [29].
The earlier versions of computer network had users access the central computer by
connecting via terminals, small hardware with limited or no computing capabilities.
These early terminals did not do much other than send and receive characters from
a mainframe or centralized computer as in a point to point network [71]. Over the
period of time these terminals got smarter as they were able to do more processing at
the terminals and most of the computing was done at the local site instead of a central
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Figure 2.1: Cloud Computing [57]
server or computer. As time progressed and with advent of PC, individual computers
became the de-facto and widely used across industry. With further revolutions in IT,
networking and Internet, a new paradigm of computing has evolved, Cloud Comput-
ing. This model does not limit a workstation capabilities with its hardware, instead
it allows to use the services provided by a shared and much better pool of resources.
It provides users and enterprises with various capabilities to store and process data in
third-party data center and utilize large shared resources [53]. The gure 2.1 shows a
high level overview of cloud architecture. Traditionally, cloud operates in the below
service models.
1. Software as a service (SaaS): It is a software delivery model in which the software
is centrally hosted and is licensed on a subscription basis.
2. Platform as a service (PaaS): This version of cloud allows users to run their
application using the cloud service providers platform. e.g. develop, run and
manage web-based application without developing and maintaining the infras-
tructure required for the software.
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3. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS): This model provides the infrastructure re-
quired for computing like operating systems, environment etc. e.g. Amazon
Web service (AWS), Windows Azure, Google Compute Engine.
2.1.1 Data Storage over Cloud
In order to understand why cloud pose a concerns for your data, it is necessary to
understand how it stores the data and what enables it to let the data be available to
you anytime and anywhere. The capabilities which allow this exibility in turn pose
risk for the users. Cloud is a made up of many distributed databases but still allows
to be treated as one. Among many feature of cloud it is noteworthy to realize that it
maintains high tolerance through redundancy and distribution of data. Data which
is stored at a server is often duplicated and kept at multiple locations which can be
located across geographies coming under dierent laws and regulations. This can be
risky in case of a government agency asking the CSP to reveal the data they have
stored in the servers.
My research intends to mitigate this problem by encrypting the document so that
even if CSP wants to reveal the data at their server, it will be of no use without the
key to decrypt the document which is in control of users/ document owners.
Cloud Data Storage tools
There are many products available in market which provide on line storage for your
data. This section will give a brief survey of the available products.
1. Dropbox: It is le hosting service operated by Dropbox Inc, headquartered in
San Fransisco, California [25]. It allows user to create folders in their local
system which it synchronizes to the server. File are accessible from Dropbox
website or mobile application.
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2. Google Drive: It is cloud based le storage and syncing service [28]. It also lets
one create, share and collaborate on documents over the Internet. It is available
for free unless the data size is less than 15GB.
3. SkyDrive / OneDrive : It is a le hosting service oered by Microsoft which lets
one create and store le and later access by web or mobile [10].
2.1.2 Security Concerns
With user data stored on a third party resource many security issues arise. Below
are short description of issues as enumerated in (Benameur, et al)[44], [63], [62], [43].
Privacy
Privacy at a coarse level refer to users control of their data and reserving the right
to expose it to others. For organizations, it entails the way they store and manage
personal identiable information. Public cloud access is the most common way of
accessing the cloud as service (which can be accessed over Internet and intranet) but
relying on the cloud service provider to handle the condentiality of the data raises
many concerns.
Lack of User control
While accessing cloud service it is not expected from service provider to cater to
users demand of restricting storage of their data and duplicating it. Data is stored
over machines where users do not have any control and places where the laws can be
dierent from the place of origin.
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Unauthorized Secondary Usage
Data over cloud is a great source of revenue of the service provider as it provides a
resource for mining interesting patterns and target ads. Moreover there is no guaran-
tee if the service provider goes bankrupt and the sells the data to gain more revenue.
These unauthorized data usage pose a great risk to the user and organizations using
the cloud service.
Data Proliferation and Trans border Data Flow
Data in cloud involves multi-parties and multi storage sites. User, who is the data
owner has no control over the sites and parties involved in the processing of his/her
data. When data in cloud is moved across sites falling under dierent legal jurisdiction
increases risk and factor and legal complexities [43].
Security Issues
Traditional security measures considered a secured perimeter with a trusted boundary-
within which information is stored and processed, to be secure. But this has changed
a lot within few years with increased access to cloud and distributed computing. Peo-
ple and data have been more dynamic and information exchange has been increasing.
With data being freely shared and distributed, It poses danger of information leak and
it is more severe for enterprises who use cloud services. It endangers their Intellectual
property and business secrets.
Traditionally, enterprises enforce IT policies and security constraints to restrict
the ow of data outside their organization. With more and more employees using
cloud for their day to day work, business now face a risk of losing or leaking out
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information. A document once uploaded over cloud may not fall under the owners
jurisdiction and is susceptible for copying or any malicious usage.
Bring your own device (BYOD) [15] is becoming very popular these days
among employees, as it gives the much needed exibility to the employees and increase
productivity. It is a growing trend among the employees to use their personal devices
for work purposes. According to a survey done by security intelligence which provides
analysis and insight for information security professionals, almost 60 percent of the
enterprises allow their employees to bring their own devices to work [3]. This shows
how popular usage of non-IT systems is. This increases the risk of information leakage
manifold as now not all the personal laptops and devices are enabled with IT policies
of the organization and not as secure as an on-premise computer. Another report
by Gartner [1] predicts that by 2017, almost half of the employers would require
employees to use their devices for work purposes.
BYOD does increase productivity and helps get things done virtually from any-
where, but a certain solution is needed to compensate the risk factors involved.
Smart Phone Tablet PC Laptop Percent of cases
Technology giant 35.7% 28.6% 35.7% 100%
Educational Institution 34.8% 34.8% 30.4% 100%
Financial Organization 42.9% 25.7% 31.4% 100%
Total average 37.8% 29.7% 32.5%
Table 2.1: BYOD devices usage frequencies in the organizations [5]
Trust Issues
With the presence of multiple vendors oering distributed computing and cloud stor-
age, there has been a race to get to cloud. Business now have many options to choose
from. However, the dynamically changing industry and the sensitivity of data may
13
be inhibiting factors against choosing for cloud. Trust is a main concern with many
industries, mainly health and nancial due to the sensitivity of the data being stored.
Since user does not have control over his/her data over cloud, they may not com-
pletely trust the cloud service provider specially if the data is related to their health
and nances.
Recent reports in media hint at government agencies like NSA being able to mine
the data stored over cloud without any prior permission. NSA PRISM program in
collaboration with large tech companies intends to do so. Media articles even suggest
that Microsoft gave NSA permission to record Skype calls and go mine user data
store over cloud [2].
This research intends to mitigate this concern as now user has complete control
over his/her data. Since the data is encrypted and stored on the cloud, CSP can
not leak info about user to any other party even if they want to. However, it is
still susceptible to techniques which aim at nding patterns/ keywords in encrypted
content [46].
Legal Aspects
Since data in cloud is stored at multiple places across geographies, laws of the land
could be dierent and may not be strict enough to protect user data. Moreover,
cloud service provider always get request from government and securities agencies to
disclose the data they have stored and are bound by law to disclose it. The USA
Patriot Act signed by Bush on Oct 26, 2001 gives the US government unfettered
ability to obtain access to data stored outside the United States by U.S. cloud service
providers or their foreign subsidiaries[9].
The presented thesis intends to solve few of the above mentioned problems. Using
an end to end encryption scheme, with separate control of key resolves below concerns:
14
1. Privacy: With end to end encryption of data, the risk of leaking data by CSP
is drastically reduced. Since it is very hard to make sense of encrypted data
without it's key, User may not worry about the content even if the encrypted
document is available to an adversary.
2. Lack of User Control: This research proposes methods by which users will have
the ability to share the keys to other users. This gives user control over their
data while still maintaining the privacy and secrecy.
3. Unauthorized Secondary Usage: Since the data is encrypted in the proposed
approach, it is dicult to use it for data mining or web scraping. However it is
susceptible to techniques which aim to search for patterns in encrypted contents
[46].
4. Data Proliferation and Trans border Data Flow: This thesis present the ap-
proach which resolves the above problem. Even if data is stored at multiple
places and under various government regulations it is of no use even if exposed
to authorities at the server.
5. Trust Issues: In the proposed approach, the key control is in users/enterprise
hand and not in control of CSP. This makes the infrastructure more trustworthy
as a third-party, the CSP, is not able to expose or leak out the sensitive data.
The users have control over who can access the data.
6. Security Issues: With the usage of Intel IPT-PKI [68], the proposed technique
is resistant to any malware and works only a trusted machine.
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2.2 Recent Attacks and Concerns
This section will briey enlist some recent attacks to give an idea of the impact of
data breaches on corporation. The intent of this section is not to enlist every attack
but only to give an idea of the importance of protecting data over cloud.
The recent cyber-attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment [38], allegedly due to the
release of the motion picture \The Interview" can be a lesson for businesses to put
in more eorts in protecting the data in cloud [52]. Analysts are predicting that the
data breach could have cost Sony as much as 100 million USD not withstanding the
lost goodwill and brand image of the company [52]. Recently IDC, International data
center, predicted that by 2020 more than 1.5 billion people will be aected by data
breaches, that is almost a quarter of world population [72].
There is a growing need for a hardened security feature for enterprises which
today face attacks from hackers. The emphasis of this thesis is to provide a hardened
security by using Intel's latest technology which would help prevent data breaches.
Patrick Moorhead, an industry analyst with Moor Insights and Strategy noted that
\If Sony and Target [8] had that hardware-based, multi-factor authentication, they
wouldn't have been hacked successfully" [48] .
2.3 Cloud Security Solution
Information Security is not very black and white to implement. The data one
wants to protect may not always be static or restricted to one person. Information is
created to be shared among many stake holders. Information is not monolithic, vari-
ous access levels for users are required according to their privilege levels. Information
right management solves this to some extent where user have dierent permissions
for any given document. However, this does not protects the data from the cloud.
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Given the popularity and various advantages of cloud services usage of cloud is very
dicult to avoid.
A general security solution in enterprise is either very restrictive or very open.
Traditional security measures assumed that information consumption in a secured
and bounded environment is secure enough. But both the solutions have their faults,
the complete and unshared security limits the users from being productive and makes
it hard to share even with an intended recipient. Using an enterprise cordoned o
environment does not restrict users to upload on cloud and is susceptible to cloud
services.
2.3.1 Cloud Security Solution Requirement
A Cloud security solution must have the following features which would solve the
purpose of security and also allow the exibility of cloud.
1. Selective Security
It should allow Users to mark any folder as secure. Users must have exibil-
ity to protect specic documents they want. A complete system-level security
hampers the performance and is very user intrusive which may lead to users
nding a way around and defeating the purpose of information protection.
2. Cloud Access
Even though uploading data on cloud in plain text is risky, the requirement here
is to allow users to upload the data to cloud in a secure fashion. The solution
should meet the corporate IT standards and cloud provider should have no
visibility into the data.
3. Sharing
The users should be able to share the documents with any authorized users. To
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provide a hassle free sharing, the users should be able to use a single click UX
to share data.
2.3.2 Intel IPT with PKI
Intel Identity Protection Technology (IPT) enables users with hardware based
security and authentication mechanism well suited for web and enterprise usage. It
is a robust, convenient way to deter identity thefts. With growing software based
attacks, this technology provides a hardened rmware based protection. This makes
it resilient to any malware running on the infected system and allow authentication
only on a trusted system. Some of its features are mentioned below [68]:
1. Strong Protection
This technology inherently benets from the comprehensive hardening measures
implemented in Intel Management Engine (ME). It is rooted in tamper-resistant
hardware and provides a much greater security than any software based security
system.
2. Low Cost and Transparency
The security feature do not require any specic or extra hardware and is cost
eective. Once installed, the user need not provide an extra set of credential or
token for a second factor authentication. He can simply provide his credential
for any website he wants to access.
3. Multiple token in one device
With many enterprises providing users with a separate token for additional
security measure, it is susceptible to loss of it. Using Intel's technology, the
token is inbuilt in the hardware and it removes carrying any separate tokens.
Furthermore, more than one token be built into the system.
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Figure 2.2: Intel IPT v1 architecture [59]
Below are mechanisms how Intel IPT works [68]:
1. Intel IPT with multi factor authentication(MFA)
Intel IPT with MFA is a connected framework which provides a seamless solu-
tion for policy based identity and access management. It integrates well within
an IT infrastructure and gives a rmware based authentication of user, platform
and network [68]. IPT integrates with windows applications using Microsoft
crypt APIs. It is similar to how smart card are usually integrated in windows
[67].
2. Intel IPT with one-time password (OTP)
Intel IP uses OTP tokens to strengthen the network and web site access, using
a second factor authentication. When a user visits a website which enables
Intel IPT, it can bind the user account with the device using the OPT token
generated in the rmware. This gives a cheaper and much stronger two-factor
authentication.
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3. Intel IPT with public key infrastructure (PKI)
It also includes support for Public Key infrastructure, where Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) [37] key pairs and certicates are generated in the embedded
security processor. RSA is a cryptosystem which is widely used for secure
communications. This helps authenticate user to a device using OS login and
device to a network via VPN. This avoids the cost of traditional smart card
reader or specially ordered PCs.
4. Intel IPT with protected transaction display (PTD)
Intel IPT can display information and receive input from user using the em-
bedded security processor. This prevents a malware scraping for inputs since it
requires a human presence to display or accept data.
2.3.3 Data Protection Using Intel IPT with PKI
Use of Intel's Technology provides an added level of security for data protection
and can be used by the enterprises to protect their sensitive information from being
leaked over to cloud. This research takes advantage of this technology to provide
a data security measure for any individual or enterprise. The Security Key used to
encrypt and decrypt data is kept securely in the rmware and any interaction or
authentication is done in the separate security processor. Figure 2.3 depicts the ow
of the key which is generated in rmware and how it interacts with the Operating
System which will subsequently be used by our application. The key is generated in
hardware using Intel Management Engine (ME), encrypted with a platform binding
key (PBK) [47] and passed back to Windows. PBK is unique for each platform using
Intel IPT with PKI. Windows then store the encrypted key in user library for storage.
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Figure 2.3: IPT Key usage and storage [59]
For using the key, the encrypted key is passed to Intel ME which is decrypted using
PBK and key is securely used in ME for authentication or any other purpose.
For this thesis we leveraged IPT with PKI version 3.0 which has the feature of
secure import and export and gives us the capability to trust that we are running on
an authentic system because of the following features:
1. Secure Import for PKI key-pair/certicate
Allows to scale Intel IPT by protecting non self generated certicates. Although
these must have been generated by Intel IPT-PKI on another system.
2. Hardware based key attestation.
It uses Enhanced Private ID (EPID), a symmetric key embedded into Intel
Hardware at manufacturing time. This provides extra protection from man in
the middle attacks.
3. This version of IPT-PKI is well suited for enterprise usages as it can be used
across multiple devices and used in Data Protection.
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Chapter 3
ELEMENTARY CRYPTOGRAPHY
To protect data from any unauthorized usage, cryptography comes in handy. Cryp-
tography means encoding a meaningful data such that only the intended recipient
and the sender can make sense out of it, i.e. decode it. This chapter will give a brief
of some important concepts about cryptography which have been used in my thesis.
The chapter starts with giving a description about encryption and decryption, the
concept of keys, and authentication. It also talk about the feasibility of encryption
algorithms which have been used to solve the problem of data protection.
3.1 Cryptography
Cryptography- art of secret writing is an eective method of controlling against
many kinds of security threats. Well disguised information can not be read or modied
easily, which protects it form unwanted interference [49]. Cryptography is rooted in
higher mathematics and number theory but a deep knowledge is not required to be
able to use cryptography.
Let us consider a scenario of message passing from Alice to Bob. Alice and Bob are
commonly used names in describing cryptographic examples. Communication is done
over a transmission channel and a third person, Chuck, an adversary wants to hinder
the message communication. Chuck may try the following [49]:
1. Block it, by preventing it reaching Bob, thereby aecting the availability of the
message
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Figure 3.1: Encryption and Decryption
2. Intercept it, by reading or listening to the message, thereby aecting the con-
dentiality of the message
3. Modify it, by seizing the message and changing it in some way, aecting the
message's integrity
4. Fabricate an authentic-looking message, arranging for it to be delivered as if it
came from another person, thereby also aecting the integrity of the message
Fortunately cryptography can help address all these points. Encryption is the
process of changing a message such that it not meaningful or is not obvious. De-
cryption is the reverse of encryption and converts the meaningless data to its original
meaningful form. Figure 3.1 shows the encryption and decryption for a plain text.
Plain text is the useful data which one wants to secure by converting it to a random -
not useful gibberish called cipher-text, which in-turn is converted to plain text using
the decryption process.
An example of encryption would a simple scheme of substituting the plain text
data with seemingly random characters. The aim of the deign is such that only
the person who knows how this scheme replaced the characters would be able to
regenerate the original message.
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3.1.1 Substitution Cipher
It is one of the simplest scheme where a character is replaced using a substitution
table. A historic and simplest example could beCeasar Cipher where each character
is replaced by shifting it a xed number of places in the alphabet series. It was used
by Julius Ceasar where he used the shift as 3, So the letter 'A' would become 'D'.
Plaintext A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Ciphertext d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a b c
E.g. Using this scheme the message 'APPROVE' would be encoded as 'dssuyh'
Analyzing the Ceasar Cipher, one would see that it is easy to remember and it
worked well in the time it was invented. It served the purpose of converting plain
text data to seemingly randomized data which would be easily decoded by the person
knowing the scheme. However, it also had a weakness that a small piece of encoded
data would reveal the encoding of the entire data. This, is not a desirable property
in any encryption algorithm.
3.1.2 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric Encryption is the oldest and best-known technique. In this scheme
of encryption a plain text is encoded using a Secret key. This key can be a combi-
nation of letters, alphabet or just any string of random characters. Using this key,
encryption can be done using any scheme or algorithm. The important characteristic
of symmetric encryption is that the same key is used to convert the encoded message
back to plain text in decryption stage. Usually, the algorithm for decryption of the
crypt text (encoded message) is almost similar to that of the encryption. E.g. In
Caesar cipher, the encryption is done by replacing the characters 3 letters later in
the alphabet. Similar to the encoding technique, the message can be decoded by
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Figure 3.2: Simple Model of Symmetric Encryption [61]
replacing the characters 3 letter earlier in the alphabet. Figure 3.2 shows a simple
model for symmetric encryption.
The Symmetric key Encryption has ve components:
1. Plain text The original message which needs to be encoded
2. Encryption Algorithm The Encryption Algorithm converts the plain text to
random data by performing various permutations and substitutions depending
on the type of algorithm used.
3. Secret Key The key which is used to encrypt and decrypt the data.
4. Cipher Text The encoded message generated from the plain text using the
secret key.
5. Decryption Algorithm The algorithm to decode the encoded data, usually
very similar to encryption algorithm.
Symmetric encryption relies on the secrecy of the key which is used to encrypt
the data. e.g. If Alice wants to communicate with Bob using a public channel of
communication, Alice can use symmetric encryption to encrypt the data and send it
over to Bob. However, the key must be securely passed to Bob and should not be
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compromised. Bob on receiving the encoded data can decrypt using the key given by
Alice. A point worth noting here is that one can argue that if key can be securely
transferred then why can't the data itself be transmitted securely. This is so because
usually the actual data is much bigger in size than the key which is used to encode it.
Securely transmitting a small data (key) is easier than transmitting the actual larger
data. This is the reason why an almost perfect encryption scheme called 'One time
pad' is not practical. One Time Pad is an encryption scheme where a plain text is
encrypted using a key of same length (One time pad). If used correctly, this gives a
perfect cipher which can not be cracked. This encryption scheme did not get much
popular due to the impracticality of securely transmitting the key which is as large
as the secret message it encodes.
3.1.3 Asymmetric Encryption
So far we have discussed about how to mangle data so that it is not easy for
any one to make sense from it. But for the intended recipient it is easy to get the
data back using a secret key. The problem with symmetric encryption is that the
key should be transmitted securely and that there should be trust between the two
parties, e.g., Let's say Alice and Bob want to securely transmit some data. There are
two main concerns which may arise:
1. Secure transfer of key
Alice needs to securely transfer the key to the she wants to communicate with.
And in case there are n people with whom Alice wants to communicate, she has
to give each person a new secret key. So that one person may not know other
person's message.
2. Key Proliferation
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Figure 3.3: Key Proliferation [49]
As mentioned above Alice needs to maintain n keys in case she wants to com-
municate with n people. In general, an n-user system requires n*(n-1)/2 keys
and also each key must be specic to each user. As the number of user increase
the number of key increase rapidly. Figure 3.3 shows how addition of a single
new user aects the existing key infrastructure.
3. Repudiation
In case there are trust issues, Alice may deny sharing any key with Bob. So
Bob can not prove the data he decrypted is actually what Alice really sent.
Asymmetric encryption or public-key cryptography resolves both the issues. The
concept originated with Die and Hellman's breakthrough at Stanford in 1976 [58].
Their major contribution to cryptography was the idea that keys could come in pair
and it would be impossible to generate one key from the other. This comes in handy
for transmitting encrypted data over an insecure channel and removes the requirement
of transmitting the secret key securely as required in symmetric encryption. Below
are the ingredients of asymmetric encryption:
1. Plain text
The actual data which is fed to the encryption algorithm to be encoded
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Figure 3.4: Asymmetric Encryption [61]
2. Encryption Algorithm
Algorithm performing the randomization or encoding of plain text.
3. Public and Private Key
This is a stark feature of public key cryptography, the pair of keys work in
tandem for encryption and decryption. One key is kept private and another
is available freely to anybody, hence they are referred to as private and public
key. Although any of the key can be public or private. One of the key is used
to perform encryption and the other key is used to perform the decryption.
4. Cipher Text
The encoded or scrambled message after the encryption.
5. Decryption Algorithm
The algorithm converts the cipher text to plain text.
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Figure 3.5: Asymmetric Authentication [61]
Figure 3.6: Stream Encryption [49]
3.1.4 Stream and Block Cipher
Stream ciphers, as the name suggest transform the data symbol by symbol. i.e.
one plain text character is encoded to a cipher text character. The encoding depends
on the input symbol, encryption key and the algorithm. Due to this property of stream
ciphers, an error in the encryption of one character, such as missing a character, can
mess up the encryption of further characters in the stream. These errors can be
recognized as the plain text will be recoverable up to a certain point and then the
error can be xed. However this makes the encryption susceptible to cryptanalysis
[18].
This problem is addressed by using another form of encryption called, Block
Cipher. Block Cipher encrypts a group of plain text symbols as one block. It works
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Figure 3.7: Block Encryption [49]
on block of plain text and convert it into a block of cipher text. Where stream ciphers
are susceptible to malicious inserts, block ciphers are immune to it. Any insertion in
the block will make the block length incorrect and the entire block will be deemed
invalid.
3.1.5 Encryption Algorithms
This section will give a brief overview of what is an encryption algorithm along
with a description of a couple of encryption algorithms. It will also discuss which
encryption algorithms have been used in the project and reasons for their usage. As
discussed earlier the process which transforms the plain text to an encrypted format
is called as an encryption algorithm. For the sake of understanding, it can be viewed
as some transpositions and jumbling which is reversible only when using a given key.
There are several encryption algorithm available which have a varied level of security
and key mechanism. There are several parameters which dene the level of security
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or trustworthiness an encryption algorithm has. An algorithm which satises below
qualities is deemed secure to be used [49] :
1. It is based on sound mathematics. The algorithm must have a mathematical
proof of correctness and derived from solid mathematical principles.
2. Analyzed by experts and found to be correct. The algorithm which has been
tested for issues by many experts is bound to be strong and resilient from any
attack.
3. It has stood the test of time. An algorithm which has been around for a long
time and still not broken, gains enough trust of users for its usage. A new algo-
rithm, as it gains popularity, is used and tested by many people. It's limitations
and mathematical foundations are reviewed time and time again. Although a
long period of successful use is not a guarantee of a good algorithm, its aws
are generally discovered relatively soon after it's release [49].
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Advanced Encryption Standard is a successor of another algorithm called DES (Data
Encryption Standard) [21], a system developed by the USA government and ocially
adopted in 1976. It works on the principle of permutation and substitution and was
an acceptable algorithm for general usage. Over the years as computing power of
computers increased, it became easy to brute force DES algorithm, i.e. try every
possible combination to break the code. AES overcame this susceptibility and was
much stronger than its predecessor, DES. It was in 2001 that AES was formally
adopted by US government [49].
AES is a symmetric encryption and work as a block cipher. Recall that symmetric
encryption requires only one key for encryption and decryption. A major improvement
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in AES over DES is the key length. Key size is a critical parameter in determining
the strength of any cipher. An encryption algorithm using a small key size can be
brute forced easily.
Due to its popularity and given test of time AES has been the clear choice for
encrypting the data in the research. Since the data is needed in blocks and a le
may not always be in even block size, a padding has been used to be able to use
AES for encryption. Details of the padding are given in implementation section of
the manuscript.
Rivest-Shamir-Adelman Encryption (RSA)
RSA algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm. Since it's introduction in 1978
it have been quite popular and remained secure. It based on the eld in mathematics
called number theory [33]. At the core of it lies the hard problem of factorizing large
numbers. Since factoring large numbers is a problem for which no one has been able
to nd a shortcut or an easy method. It is considered as a solid basis of public key
crypto system or asymmetric encryption.
There are two keys used in RSA d and e. These two can be used interchangeably
but one must be kept private and another becomes public. A user which wants to
share data with you must encrypt his message with your public key which only you
can decrypt with your private key. E and D can be viewed as a complimentary
function which can be applied in any order.
P = E(D(P )) = D(E(P ))) (3.1)
E and D can be thought as complimentary functions, which undo each other's
eect. A plain text block is encrypted as P emodn. Factoring P e to uncover the plain
text is dicult since exponentiation is performed mod n. However, the intended
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receiver who knows the decrypting key d can easily retrieve P by computing (P e)d
mod n. The underlying principle of RSA is based on factoring large numbers. Until
now, nobody has found a easy way to factor large numbers in a nite set, called a
eld [49]. It is considered to be a solid basis for a good crypto-system because this
problem of factorizing large numbers has been around for many years and doesn't
have an easy solution.
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Chapter 4
DATA PROTECTION ARCHITECTURE
The aim of data protection policy is to provide an end-to-end secure transfer of
data and protecting the encrypted data from leaking or being accessed by unintended
users/process. Traditionally, secure transfer of data is taken care by network protocols
which can guarantee that data is not tampered over the network and is received by
intended recipient. However, with increasing integration of cloud computing and
cloud based apps, data is not secure even if it is present at the intended recipients
desktop/machine. For protection over cloud and/or from service provider, we need
to encrypt the data and create an infrastructure for the secure migration of the key
to decrypt the data. I present below the components of data protection over cloud
with a brief introduction as well.
4.1 Overview and Approach
In order to achieve the research objective as introduced earlier in the manuscript
1.4, a two pronged strategy is required. A part of the system which runs on the client
machine which takes care of the security sub-system, and interacts with the Windows
OS to keep track of the sensitive documents. This module requires to interact with
the trusted server and authorized processes to expose the data. For the remainder
of the section these modules would be generally referred as client modules as these
are the software modules running on the client machine. The following sections will
describe the intuition behind each module and how it relates to the objective.
The second section of data protection architecture comprises of services running
at a trusted server which is responsible for the migration of the security key, autho-
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rization of users and users sharing documents. These features are required since our
aim is to keep the security measures such that it does not hinders the usability of the
system. A normal use case for a cloud enabled service is creating a document and
accessing it at a dierent system without manually transferring it. Our proposed so-
lution tries to not hinder this ow, but be able to intercept the data before the cloud
process and allow a similar work-ow at the destination system. The server, referred
as migration authority thereafter, makes sure that the document at the destination
is readable only if the system/user is authorized. And the client modules at the des-
tination do the remaining part of securing the data. To make the proposed solution
more user friendly and usable, we also propose document sharing functionality, where
users can share documents with each other, as a normal unsecured/plain-text sharing
would do.
4.1.1 Protecting Data on the Disk
Protecting data on the disk can be considered as a rst step toward building a
granular security system. We rst assessed which cryptographic algorithms to use to
encrypt the data and then the ways to implement the encryption. In order to prevent
data theft from any malware at the system, it is required to minimize any plain text
version of our data. To achieve this we evaluated ways one can monitor the le system
and protect the data on the disk by interacting with windows OS.
Monitoring File changes
In order to keep the data secure and protected from any attack it must be kept
encrypted on the disk and only decrypted after authenticating the user and process
requesting the data. In this section, I will describe how to encrypt the les whenever
they are modied. This is required because the data should not be stored or exposed
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to cloud services in plain text. This relates with windows OS internals and le system
services. This File changes monitor component keeps the track of the le on local
hard disk and decrypts the data on the y, after user authentication. There are
more than one approach to let the data be encrypted on any changes. I will brief
the approaches below and will give the details in the implementation section of the
manuscript.
1. ReadDirectoryChanges
The proof of concept utilized Read Directory Changes Windows API provided
by Microsoft to monitor the disk activity of a particular folder. A very handy
implementation by Jim Beverdge is available at his blog [45] which has been
utilized in a prior version for the project. ReadDirectoryChangesW was intro-
duced in Windows 2000 which reported what changes were made on the disk
at a cost of added complexity. It was an advancement over previously avail-
able APIs like FindFirstChangeNotification which reported that something
changed but did not report what changed. ReadDirectoryChangesW gets very
complex as there are many combinations of I/O mode, waiting methods, and
threading models [45].
In our research, we used the above API to monitor a folder which contains
the original documents, and whenever a change is made, the corresponding
document in the cloud directory is updated, .i.e., the encrypted version of the
document is uploaded on the cloud. Using this approach the we were able to
prevent the plain text data be available to cloud and let it upload only the
encrypted content. A major drawback of this approach is that it lets a copy of
plain text data to be present at the system, hidden from the cloud but vulnerable
to any malware on a compromised system. Another alternative which overcome
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this shortcoming is to use a le system lter driver as described in the next
section.
2. File System Filter Driver
A quick and secure way of intercepting le system requests is by using a le
system lter driver. It is not a device driver but an optional driver that lets
one modify behavior of a le system or add value to it. A device driver is a
software component that controls a particular hardware I/O device. E.g. a
printer driver is used to communicate to the printer connected to the system.
In contrast, a le system driver works in conjugation with le systems to control
I/O operations. A le system lter driver can be used to log, modify, delete or
even deny access to any request to the le system. It has typical application in
anti-virus, encryption utilities and management system [41].
This proved to be an improvement over our previous approach for protecting
data on the disk as it provided a run time control over the le changes. Next
section will provide more details about le system drivers and where it aligns
in the Windows OS stack.
User Space and Kernel Space At a broad level, a program execution in
OS is executed in kernel mode or user mode. Memory in the OS is divided
in two modes: user and kernel. Critical system process which require higher
privileges e.g. syscall are executed in a secure mode called kernel mode. The
user application or programs running in user mode do not have access to critical
system instructions. This prevents user applications from accessing areas of the
system which can lead to system wide instability. User application however can
access kernel level function in a restrictive environment. Processes can switch
between user mode and kernel mode by using system calls.
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Figure 4.1: Eldos SDK [16]
Eldos Filter Driver [16] provides an SDK to build an user space driver to monitor
and track disk activity. This has been used in the project to monitor the disk
activity. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the placement of Eldos lter driver
in the windows OS stack and its interaction with other utilities.
Process Restriction Component
The above sections described how we are able to protect data on the disk but we
also need to allow users/authorized processes to be able to use the data for reading
and writing. This requires a component which would allow selective decryption and
access to plain text data. The component process restriction component was created
to achieve this goal. A brief functionality for this component is as follows. Users must
be able to decrypt and access the data while the same data should not be allowed
to be accessed by cloud service providers. This component restricts the cloud service
provider process to get access to the decrypted data.
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For our proof of concept, windows explorer process [26] was allowed access to
the data. Where as cloud service providers like DropBox [25], GoogleDrive [28], etc.
where treated as unauthorized process. These processes would not be allowed to read
decrypted data.
Encryption/decryption utility
Once we have control over the run time request for a le and established if we are
going to go ahead or deny the request using the previous described module, we need
to perform the actual task of encryption. This section describes the part of system
which deals with cryptography and the ways it has been utilized for data protection.
In order to protect the data, so that only authorized parties can have access to
it, encryption is used to convert the data in a form which only the authorized parties
can convert back to a readable form. Converting the data to a meaningless format
is called encryption and converting it back is called decryption. A key is a construct
which is the link between the two formats.
There are various ways one can protect the data on the disk. One of the popular
methods is to encrypt the data on the entire disk. This method does provide the
needed protection but it takes a toll on the system and treats the entire data in a
same way. Most businesses protect their laptops using this scheme but it puts the
entire security responsibility in the enterprise's hand and does not give the exibility
and much needed selectiveness in securing the data as discussed in section 2.3.1.
To keep the process quicker and not impact the performance we use a encryption
scheme, digital envelope [23]. It is a secure electronic container which is used
to protect data through encryption. It utilizes the speed of symmetric encryption
algorithm and security of asymmetric encryption algorithm. A description for these
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algorithms is already provided in chapter 3, here we discuss its usefulness for our
requirements.
The major drawback of asymmetric ciphers are the speed and security strength
[60]. An asymmetric cipher is based on computational problems which determine its
key strength, e.g : The RSA algorithm is based on Integer Factorization Problem(IFP)
[30], Die-Hellman algorithm is based on Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [24].
The computational cost makes asymmetric algorithm less ecient and takes up much
resources [51]. Symmetric algorithm on the other hand is faster but needs the secret
key to be secure.
In order to maintain the security and performance, a hybrid mechanism is needed
which over comes the problem we face with the above mentioned algorithms. The
bulk of encryption is done using a symmetric key, which is fast, and the symmetric
key itself is encrypted using public key cryptography and stored in the le header.
The public key cryptography utilizes Intel's IPT with PKI infrastructure to securely
decrypt the symmetric key. This approach gives the required performance benet
and maintains the needed security.
4.1.2 Enabling Mobility
The previous section described how we are able to protect data on the disk. In
this section I will detail about enabling the required mobility of the protected data.
The encrypted document is uploaded on the cloud and it needs to be decrypted at
the destination. Due to the client modules present at the system, encrypted content
is uploaded on the cloud which takes care of the transfer of the data. A key migration
system is designed which would allow a secure decryption of the encrypted data. The
below section describes the way it has been implemented satisfying our requirement.
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Key Migration System (KMS)
In order to securely decrypt the data, the encryption key is needed at the destination.
This component is responsible for migrating the user key from source to destination.
It is designed to be an enterprise on-premise server that interface with the Enterprise
Identity Protection. The server must be a trusted machine and highly secure. Se-
curing a single machine is easier than securing the individual clients connecting to
the server. We have designed the service to be similar to a server-client architecture
which could be run as an IIS service on an enterprise network. It needs to support
both push and pull model since a new document can be created as well as an existing
one need to be decrypted on a new machine. The following section will describe the
responsibilities the service has been designed with, along with the motivation for each
functionality.
1. Client Authentication
A major requirement for connection to KMS is authentication. Server need to
authenticate the client in order to start the communication. It needs to be more
secure and this is where Intel IPT-PKI plays an important part. It provides
a rmware enabled authentication making sure that client is connecting from
an authorized system and a malware is not trying to spoof the system. This
technique is part of trusted computing technology which enables hardware based
protection loading it with a special encryption key inaccessible to rest of the
system [39]. This is achieved using certicates, a process called attestation, and
encrypting a nonce which gives the proof that the server has the correct key.
The authentication process is described in detail in section 4.3.
2. Client Attestation
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The server needs to verify if the client has the correct key and the client is in
fact a trusted machine in order to start the import/export of key. This is done
with the help of Intel IPT-PKI which gives the proof of key being generated in
the rmware. This module takes care of interacting with rmware to make sure
the system is authentic. Intel IPT Attestation [59] aims to provide evidence
that the key is protected by Intel security engine. It uses enhanced privacy
identier(EPID) to achieve this. EPID is an asymmetric key embedded into
Intel hardware at manufacturing time.
3. Key storage at server
The keys must be stored at a trusted machine acting as server. Server stores
the keys and the user mapping. It also denes the operation type which the
client will perform. If it does not have user key the client needs to generate a
user key and export to the server. Depending on the presence of key, the client
perform import or export operation.
4. Database Management
The centralized highly secured server is required to manage various Keys and
identication for the users. As the number of users grow a database is needed
to store the following information important for migration and maintenance of
the users. For our proof of concept we used a serialized hash map to store the
information. The server needs to store some information in order to uniquely
identify the resource and the user it belongs to. This information is looked up
when a request for a document key is made later in the process. Below are the
elds which were stored at the server:
User or GROUP ID : This is a unique identier to identify a user. This identi-
cation can also be used to enable group level access or a single user access.
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Figure 4.2: KMS Responsibility
GUID or resource ID: This is a unique identier for a resource. A resource
could be a le or a folder located at a client destination, it serves as a name
for a protected entity. The GUID is also used as a key container name while
communicating with crypto service providers at client.
5. Maintain revocation list
The server also needs to maintain the list of users who have been revoked. In
case of user revocation, his account and corresponding keys must be invali-
dated. This prevents users from accessing the document when a user has left
the organization.
Figure 4.2 depicts the above discussed responsibilities pictorially. E.g. KMS will
reject a connection request from system which is not running on a trusted platform.
It also stores list of users and their key for authentication or rejection if the key is
expired or invalid.
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4.2 File Header
File header plays an important role in enabling the security system. Each le
should have a separate key which needs to be attached with it along with other
required options. This data is stored in the rst block of the le as a le header.
Meta data about the le is stored in the le header which allows to identify the le
and extract the session key for the le. The le header also helps in adding any
information which will be helpful in adding more functionality. E.g. information
about the parent folder on the system is also stored in the le header which is used
to group les in a particular folder and provide folder level exibility.
The le is encrypted using a symmetric key which itself is encrypted by the user
key and stored in the le header. Figure 4.3 shows the structure of the le pictorially.
In another version of the solution File Header has been modied to include a specic
GUID so as to identify the les for particular folder.
Fields stored in le header
1. Container:
This is a unique identier which identies a le or folder. This is also used as
a container for storing the key using MS cryptography APIs.
2. Key:
The key used to encrypt and decrypt the content
3. Initialization vector (IV):
IV is an arbitrary number often called nonce [19], which is used along with the
security key for encryption [31]. It's makes it dicult for any hacker to utilize
dictionary attacks [22] to crack the encrypted data.
Structure of File Header Class:
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Figure 4.3: File Header Overview
1. Key: This eld stores the key used for encryption and decryption.
2. IV eld: This eld stores the IV associated with the key.
3. Parent Folder: This eld is used to keep track of the folder in which the le
reside. This is helpful in identifying and grouping all the les under one folder
identier.
4.3 Key Export Procedure
The export mechanism deals with securely connecting to server and storing the
key for its usage for decryption at the destination. The client module connects to
migration authority module and authenticates itself before exporting the key. It
follows below steps for key export:
1. The client acquires it's public key and sends it to the server along with user's
credentials. The server veries user's credentials and public key. This is a two-
step verication. First the user's credential, what the user know and second is
the authentication of trusted system trusted computing. The user's credential
can be the cloud service provider credentials or an active directory credential.
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Figure 4.4: Key Exchange
To verify for cloud credential, OAuth v2.0 protocol [34] is used. For enterprise
using active directory [11], authentication is done using LDAP protocol [12].
2. The server then encrypts a random set of bytes nonce with the received public
key from the client and sends it back. Server also creates a user session and
stores the user info along with the public key. The public key of user is con-
verted to PKCS 11 format (public key cryptography standards) [35] used to
communicate to hardware crypto system.
3. The client on receiving the encrypted data, decrypts it using it's corresponding
private key and sends the nonce back to the server for verication. Server
veries the key and determines if client can perform export operation. Server
then sends a certicate to the client for exporting the key.
4. Client reads the certicate and extract the server's public key to export its key
in a PKCS7 blob [36].
5. Server reads the RSA key in the exported blob and stores in a le/database for
the user. Over the course of time, as the number of keys increases, it can be
stored in a database instead of le. For our research, we chose to use les to
store information.
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4.4 Key Import Procedure
Similar to Key export procedure key import is also done after rst step verica-
tion of user's credentials and client public key. After successful completion of the
handshake protocol as depicted in 4.4 and described in section 4.3, secure import is
processed. The client sends the key container name and its certicate for import and
server sends the key and it is imported in the Intel CSP container.
4.5 Key Sharing
The encrypted le should be able to be decrypted at the client upon successful
authentication of the user. This is a two step process, rst the user must provide his
credentials, cloud or Active directory. This is to let him access his les or les to
which he is authorized. Second is the Firmware based key authentication using Intel
IPT with PKI which lets the user decrypt the encrypted document. This is taken
care by the Key Migration Authority. This model allows a user to upload his data
over cloud and use it on other system. However, in a normal day to day scenario,
documents are shared by people. This creates a need to share the corresponding
secret key to the authorized users.
The key sharing modules lets the users share the document with another user in their
organization and takes care of providing the key to this user. Figure 4.5 shows a
pictorial representation of key sharing mechanism. The sharing process is carried out
as below:
1. User1 shares a folder or le by specifying another user's email.
2. Migration authority updates this information at a secure and central repository.
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Figure 4.5: Key Sharing Overview
3. User2 connects to KMS using the same two step authentication process as de-
scribed earlier. User1's encrypted le is transferred to User2 over cloud. KMS
is not responsible for transferring the entire le itself. It is only responsible to
provide the key to decrypt that le upon successful authentication for user2.
KMS upon user2 request for decryption checks if the user has been authorized
to this le. User2 email should be same as specied by User1 for the requested
le in the previous step.
4. If authorized, the KMS exports the key and the client service at user2 securely
decrypts the le.
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Chapter 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
The proof of concept was implemented using .Net platform (C#) [4] and uses
Microsoft Cryptographic APIs for encryption. It also uses Intel CSPs (Cryptographic
Service Provider) [20] and DAL (Dynamic Application Loader) [7] for interacting with
underlying rmware and cryptography services.
5.1 Protecting Data on Disk
A major problem with data protection is avoiding plain text data present on the
system to be accessed by cloud service provider. The implementation using Read
Directory Windows API used an approach where the cloud directory is synced with
a protected directory which has a corresponding unprotected directory. User make
changes in the unprotected directory and the corresponding le in protected directory
is updated with the changes - encrypted. This way, plain text is not exposed to cloud
but an encrypted copy of it is uploaded on the cloud. Any subsequent updates for
the documents is encrypted and synced with the cloud directory. This approach has
a disadvantage that it lets the plain text get stored in the le system where it is
susceptible to any virus or malware attack.
A better approach is to use a le system driver to encrypt and decrypt the data
whenever a le is saved or updated. This way data stored on the disk is always en-
crypted and decrypted only when there is a legible request for read. This approach
gives more control over windows OS le system requests. We have used Eldos le sys-
tem lter driver [16] to control the request to le system and hook up our encryption
and decryption system.
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Load order group Level Description
FSFilter Encryption 140000-149999 This group includes lter
drivers that encrypt and de-
crypt data during le I/O.
Table 5.1: Load Level for FS Filter Driver [32]
5.1.1 Consideration for Other File System Drivers
Windows mini lter architecture allows multiple le system drivers to run each
with an altitude of its own. E.g. other le system driver present on a system, anti-
virus or a disk encryption utility, can interfere with our le system driver if not
congured correctly.
During our research, we faced similar problem when our le system driver was
giving incorrect results due to interaction with anti-virus present on the system. The
resolution was to use Eldos le system driver in a mini-lter mode with a specied
level according to Microsoft denition.
Microsoft Windows XP and later OS provide a dedicated set of load order for le
system driver that are loaded at system start up time. A lter can only be attached
on the top of the stack of the already attached lter and can not be inserted in the
stack. Hence the order of lter load is important [32].
5.1.2 Virtual File
One problem with using le lter for runtime encryption is when we need to
selectively send the data for the le. That is, for one process we want the encrypted
data and another process to have the data decrypted. A simple approach that comes
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to mind to achieve this is to check for the calling process, and perform decryption or
not decrypt and the request go through. However, the problem with this approach
is related to the design of OS cache. Once a le is accessed the data is stored in the
cache and provided to the next application which requests for it. Currently we do
not have control over this behavior of OS cache and made use of virtual les to allow
for selective decryption.
Virtual le comes in handy to give a work around for this problem. For one le
A.txt a second dummy le is created, A.txt.enc, which simply acts as a placeholder
to redirect calls to the restricted process. Let's say one does not wants Dropbox to
access decrypted content. Call back lter can achieve this, it can restrict showing
selected les to any processes. Using this, Dropbox views A.txt.enc as A.txt and
sends the request to access it. However, the request sent to OS is for A.txt.enc which
is dierent than A.txt, Hence the problem with cache is circumvented and the request
for the le can be intercepted separately and the data passed as encrypted. While
for the authorized processes, the normal le A.txt will be access and decrypted.
5.1.3 Sample Flow: File Creation
Figure 5.1 shows how a User action triggers the system which intercepts the calls
and subsequently invokes underlying layers for further actions. The gure shows a
sample call routine when a User creates a le in the protected directory. Filter driver
intercepts the call to le system and provides a Call Back function (write call back)
which is then queried with Intel IPT-PKI CSP for user's key. If the user key is not
present an import procedure is triggered which imports the encrypted key from the
key migration authority and stores in the CSP. Using this CSP, a new symmetric key
is generated to encrypt the le and encrypted with user key and stored in the le
header for future encryption and decryption.
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Figure 5.1: File Creation Flow diagram
5.2 Data Protection Service
It is the core module which is responsible for monitoring the le system and
connecting to the server for secure key migration. It is designed to run as a service at
the client which runs in background with very less user interaction. The reason it has
minimal user interaction is because security application should not be much intrusive
such that it aects the productivity of users. The service upon start, instantiate and
registers the le system driver and sets the callback to intercepts.
5.2.1 Encrypt Context Class
Each le in the protected directory is associated with an encrypt context to store
the meta data and key information. This is represented by encrypt context class. It
stores the following information:
1. Session key and initialization vector.
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2. File information using WIN32 structure.
3. File Header having the encrypted keys and GUIDs.
4. Buer Size:
Size of the buer which is read from the disk. This is used in reading the header
from the le stored on disk and properly osetting further reads.
5. Reference Counter:
Used to free the memory if it is not in use by any object anymore.
5.2.2 File Header Module
This module is used to read and store the le header information from the le
stored on the disk. It stores key and the IV. The structure also has a ag variable
which helps decide if the le already has a header or a new header is required to
be generated for a new le. Whenever a le is opened or edited, le header class
is instantiated and the three elds are stored: container, key and IV. It is also re-
sponsible for starting a session with the migration authority in case the client does
not have the key to decrypt the user key for the le (the case when a user receives
a shared le in his cloud directory). It requests the migration authority for the key,
providing the user information and attestation public key with a nonce, following the
authentication process as described in Chapter 4, Section: 4.4.
5.2.3 File Filter
This section explains how Eldos le lter is implemented in the project. The
API provides callbacks functions which are used to call our specic functions. API
is invoked by calling SetRegistrationKey() and InstallDriver(). Eldos provides
two classes of callbacks:
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1. Notify CallBack :
These callback are used to notify of any operation that has been performed.
These have their application in audit application which only keep track of the
activities.
2. Control CallBack:
These callback lets the application take control of the execution of some opera-
tion. These function intercept the request before it is passed to the le system.
These are used in our project to deny or modify any le system request.
The following section gives a short description of few important callbacks used in
the project below:
1. CbFltReadFileC
This callback function is called when there is request for a read of a le. The
function has buer location, size to read and the start location. At this point
the data from le system has not yet been read but it is used to make sure the
position and the number of bytes to read are oset by correct position. Oset is
required because we do not want to pass the header of the le to the application
requesting the data for the le.
2. CbFltPostReadFileC
The callback provides the number of bytes which are to be read and the location
of the buer. Using this information the buer is decrypted and the modied
data is stored in buer and the request is passed to the OS.
3. CbFltWriteFileC
This callback is called after a le is written and data is modied. Similar to
read callback it provides the buer, location and bytes to write. The data in
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the buer is overwritten with the encrypted content and request is passed to
the underlying le system. Care is taken while encrypting data such that the
buer size is not oset by the encrypted data. To take care of this problem,
two approaches are used:
(a) Use stream cipher
Stream cipher converts one plain text character to encode character. This
gives te encrypted data size which is same as the input data size. However
stream cipher is not very secure and prone to error as described in previous
Chapter 3 on cryptography.
(b) Use block encryption
To increase the strength of encryption, block encryption is used to encrypt
buer data. However, since buer size is xed and data is accessed in
multiples of buer size. A padding is used to make the data size equal to
that of required block size by the encryption algorithm
(c) Use Block Encryption in counter mode.
A better approach is to use a block encryption algorithm, AES in counter
(CTR) mode. Counter mode turns a block cipher in to stream cipher
by using a counter which is used to generate the next key stream. The
counters are generated such that they are not derivable from last values
for long, if at all [64].
Using AES encryption algorithm in CTR mode gave us exibility with the
data size and also the existing security of block encryption algorithm. This
scheme did not require us to add a padding to the last chunk of data in
order to use AES block encryption. CTR mode also allows to access and
decrypt random bits which gives more exibility in data decryption.
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5.3 Migration Authority
Migration Authority is hosted as a service on a trusted computer and built as a
WCF service. Important function it exposes to the client are:
1. Login
This function is the initiating function and has to be called rst when connecting
to the server. It takes the user credentials and the public key and returns a nonce
encrypted with the user's public key. It also stores the public key, user and the
type of operation to be performed in a user session at the server. Type of
operation is set to unknown at the rst login, but changed to import or export
depending on the presence of the key at the client.
2. Export
This function extracts the input key envelope and stores the key at the server
for the container name passed as input.
3. Import
This function wraps the key for the user in a pkcs7 envelope [36] using the
received certicate and the user/container name.
4. Authorize User
This function is responsible for sharing the le between users and determines if
a user requesting for a le has been given permission to access. This information
is specied by the user sharing the le.
5. VerifyKey
This function decides which operation to perform at the client side. The server
decides whether to do a key push or pull by checking if it has a key present for
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the connected client. If the server has the key for client, a export operation is
performed, else an import operation is done. This avoids the explicit request
from client for key import or export and limits the aect of rogue clients.
5.4 Evaluation
The aim of data protection is to provide an end-to-end security system which can
be used by the users without being too intrusive and not impacting the performance
adversely. We evaluated the system such that it satises our primary motive of
protecting data from cloud service provider and tested the migration of security key.
We evaluated the system on varying size and type of les and time taken to import
or export the key to ascertain the feasibility and practicality of the approach.
Our solution provides a novel way to protect your document which is not exposed
in clear to cloud service provider. The solution also makes it possible to take the
control of the key for the protected document. The key is rmly kept protected in
the rmware and is only exposed at the destination system with the same secured
system. This achieves the objectives we described in section 1.4
1. Decryption only on selected platform
We tested the solution such that it decrypts only on the systems enabled by
Intel IPT-PKI technology. An experiment was set up to create and upload data
on the cloud using our system where both the end system where enabled with
Intel vPro technology. We veried the following:
 The documents uploaded on the cloud were encrypted.
 The documents on the end system were only accessible while our encryption
system was running.
 The document were decrypted correctly at the other system.
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We also veried that our system did not decrypt the data on non Intel IPT-PKI
enabled systems thus increasing the security of the data.
2. Encryption Verication
The solution was veried on various inputs to verify it's security. We have
used AES in counter mode which allowed us to test with random size of data.
Although reverifying a cryptographic algorithm is not feasible but we tested
our solution to make sure we have the right implementation. Below types of
data set was input to the system and the output cipher text was veried to not
contain any patterns as such.
 Random input data
 Sample test data
 Stream of 0s. and same data
The table 5.2 displays few sample inputs to show the encrypted content. Please
note that not all characters of cipher text are in printable format so the corre-
sponding hex values are also given.
3. Encryption performance
We evaluated the performance of our encryption system on multiple iteration
of test data. The performance was validated against the below formula 3.
T = k  n+ i+ f (5.1)
where:
(a) T is the encryption time
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Plain Text PlainText Hex Cipher Text CipherText Hex
Encrypting same data
test 74 65 73 74 %6G 25 C2 36 47
test 74 65 73 74 p  70 A5 11 06
test 74 65 73 74  0E EE 17 20
Sample word test.
53 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 77
6F 72 64 20 74 65 73 74 2E
a.UP.rh
61 1B 55 50 88 12 AE B2
72 C3 E4 68 CB FD 92 BC
A5
Encrypting Random Bytes
@.L-5%H.
40 00 4C D0 2D DB F3 35
25 48 F1 1D 20 89 A4 CA
."c..$O4`
90 22 63 D9 02 8C BE 15
24 4F 34 BA 9C 83 C7 60
Table 5.2: Sample Test Results for encryption
(b) n is the input data size, in bytes
(c) i is the processing time needed to begin the processing.
(d) f is the time needed to wrap up the encryption. i.e. after the last encrypted
bit it output.
(e) k is the asymptotic encryption speed.
To evaluate the encryption system, various size of data was encrypted repeatedly
to note the timings. Since the performance depends heavily on CPU usage and
hardware. System was evaluated at various instances to asses generic performance.
The conguration for the test system was as below:
 Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5300U CPU @ 2.30GHz 2.30GHz
 Memory: 8.00 GB
 System type: 64-bit Operating System, x64-bit processor
Time was measured using StopWatch Class provided by .Net platform. Stop-
Watch.ElapsedTicks property gives the elapsed time measures in timer ticks. It is
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i f k  n ticks Time(ms) size (KB)
1668.3 27.2 4088.4 5783.9 2.58105081464709 10
1746.5 41.2 4248.5 6036.2 1.89588242985324 256
1674.8 46.3 3986.8 5707.9 1.77909946365515 512
1831 74.8 4192.8 6098.6 1.87102644507207 1024
1746.8 112.7 4106.3 5965.8 1.83242603782661 2046
2274.7 247.2 5797.9 8319.8 2.58729827940358 4092
2119.6 383.7 4921.9 7425.2 2.19638548464038 8184
4341.1 2503.8 8821.3 15666.2 3.93648291831574 16368
3627.1 1369.8 5396.7 10393.6 2.4082637893819 26188
6580.7 2264.9 8191.8 17037.4 3.65557012801502 32736
7161.5 3643.7 6447.8 17253 2.87731451834947 65472
12773.1 6717.8 6738.5 26229.4 3.00703866154315 130944
32688.1 25478.3 13538.4 71704.8 6.04147691851834 523776
61798.7 50205.5 20464.6 132468.8 9.1322762325467 1047552
176552.9 122156.9 68443.3 367153.1 30.5426503262738 2095104
280575.2 218752 99805.7 599132.9 44.5380423747685 4190208
510962.5 397516.1 129538.7 1038017.3 57.8063187751042 8380416
984262.4 804122.1 285990.6 2074375.1 127.622585299091 16760832
Table 5.3: Encryption time over various byte size
system hardware dependent and is the smallest unit of time that StopWatch can
measure. It is converted to absolute time by using StopWatch.Frequency eld which
indicates timer precision and resolution. Frequency of the test system was 2240909
ticks per second, which resolves to (1/2240909) seconds per tick.
The results show the amount of time spent in various stages, i.e. initializing
the data and crypto algorithm, performing actual encryption and wrapping up the
encryption. Figure 5.2 shows the break up of time taken in various stages in the
encryption. One can analyze that most of the time is taken in initializing and nalizing
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Figure 5.2: Encryption Time Analysis
Figure 5.3: Time With and Without Encryption
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stages, which explains the crypto algorithm which is been used in the implementation.
We have used AES algorithm in CTR mode where we rst pre-process the plain text
block using a nonce and a block number. The cryptographic object is initialized and
then the actual encryption is performed. After encrypting the processed buer, the
resultant buer is simply XORed with the input and the encrypted block. This results
in the output buer, whose size is equal to that of input buer. Figure 5.3 shows a
comparison between the time taken to encrypt data buer versus time taken just to
process the buer without encryption. Encryption does take a hit on the performance
but it is still in order of milliseconds and grows as the data size increase along with
the time without any encryption.
5.4.1 Key Import and Export Timings
In a experimental set up, timings were noted for the import and export using the
proof of concept. The machines were Intel Vpro platform based and supported Intel
IPT-PKI infrastructure. The timings were measured on a typical enterprise laptop
with SSD HardDisk and 8 GB RAM. Table 5.4 show the timings. These timings were
noted while running the system on debug mode so they also involve the debug and
logging time.
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Function Time (ms)
GetPublicKey 980
Login 98
DecryptWithKey 365
Get Attestation 2137
VerifyKey 10
GetCertiifacteforImport 535
Get 9090
Export 110
Total 13421
Function Time (ms)
GetPublicKey 317
Login 5126
DecryptWithKey 471
Get Attestation 214
VerifyKey 4
GetCertForImport 519
Import 110
SetPKCS7Envelope 796
Total 9594
Table 5.4: Time Taken for Export and Import Operation
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
With data attacks getting common these days the proposed security architecture
which utilizes hardware based protection makes a strong defense from the recent at-
tacks. The research implemented a proof of concept for securing the data and making
it attack resistant using Intel based IPT-PKI infrastructure. This feature gives an
improvement over other similar solutions which do not have a hardware based se-
curity. The manuscript talked about recent attacks and how threats to information
due to increased usage of cloud rises. A novel solution using hardened security was
presented and architecture was discussed. This report also described applicable theo-
retical concepts and usage of cryptography in protecting the data. The research also
implemented le system lter driver to monitor data on hard disk and provide run
time protection from cloud service provider.
The solution has many use cases which make this concept useful to various sce-
narios. It has its usage in web email based encryption. Web based email (yahoo [42],
gmail [27] can be encrypted using enterprise based criteria which gives another level
of protection.
Another application is in health care industry where a health care personnel has
to interact with many systems and enter his/credential across various system. Using
the presented concept, the login information can be securely transferred to multiple
devices and is tamper proof on unauthorized system.
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6.1 Further Work
The proposed solution in our research protects the data at rest and in transit.
However while the data is in memory, it is still susceptible to a malware running on
escalated privileges. The data need not be protected only when it is static but also
during run time. To increase the level of protection another technology, Intel SGX can
be used which protects the sensitive data from unauthorized access or modication
by rogue software running at higher privilege levels [54].
Data Security is a eld where new attacks would be discovered with passage of
time and new methods of prevention will need to be invented. And as such, no
software can guarantee 100% protection from any attacks. But with innovation and
research, attacks can be mitigated and information can be secured.
65
REFERENCES
[1] \Gartner predicts by 2017, half of employers will require employees to sup-
ply their own device for work purposes", URL http://www.gartner.com/
newsroom/id/2466615 (2013).
[2] \How secure is microsoft skydrive?", URL "http://www.tomsguide.com/us/
how-secure-microsoft-skydrive,review-1815.html" (2013).
[3] \State of byod and mobile security report latest insights trends and stats",
URL "https://securityintelligence.com/state-of-byod-and-mobile-
security-report-latest-insights-trends-and-stats/" (2014).
[4] \C #", URL https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/kx37x362.aspx
(2015).
[5] \Cmu graphics lab motion capture database", URL http://mocap.cs.cmu.edu/
(2015).
[6] \Examining the security of cloud-based vs. on-premise deployments", URL
http://www.infor.com/content/industry-insights/security-of-cloud-
vs-on-permise-deployments.pdf/ (2015).
[7] \Intel identity protection technology with pki", URL http://www.intel.
com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/identity-
protection/identity-protection-technology-general.html (2015).
[8] \Target hacked", URL http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/target-
hacked/ (2015).
[9] \Usa patriot act eect on cloud computing services", URL "http:
//www.itlawgroup.com/resources/articles/113-usa-patriot-act-
effect-on-cloud-computing-services" (2015).
[10] URL http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/skydrive-to-
onedrive (2016).
[11] \Active directory", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_
Directory (2016).
[12] \Authentication using ldap", URL http://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/LDAP-HOWTO/
authentication.html (2016).
[13] \Better cloud", URL https://www.bettercloud.com/ (2016).
[14] \Boxcryptor", URL https://www.boxcryptor.com/en (2016).
[15] \Bring your own device", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bring_
your_own_device (2016).
66
[16] \Callbacklter", URL https://www.eldos.com/cbflt/ (2016).
[17] \Cipher cloud, trust in cloud", URL https://www.ciphercloud.com/ (2016).
[18] \cryptanalysis", URL http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/
cryptanalysis (2016).
[19] \Cryptographic nonce", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Cryptographic_nonce (2016).
[20] \Cryptographic service provider", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Cryptographic_Service_Provider (2016).
[21] \Data encryption algorithm", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_
Encryption_Standard (2016).
[22] \Dictionary attack", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary_
attack (2016).
[23] \Digital envelope", URL https://www.techopedia.com/definition/18859/
digital-envelope (2016).
[24] \Discrete logarithmic problem", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Discrete_logarithm (2016).
[25] \Dropbox - le storage and backup", URL https://www.dropbox.com/ (2016).
[26] \Explorer", URL http://www.paretologic.com/resources/paretolabs/
exe/explorer_exe.aspx (2016).
[27] \Gmail", URL http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/definition/Gmail
(2016).
[28] \Google drive - a safe place for all your les", URL https://www.google.com/
drive/ (2016).
[29] \A history of cloud computing", URL http://www.computerweekly.com/
feature/A-history-of-cloud-computing (2016).
[30] \Integer factorization", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integer_
factorization (2016).
[31] \Intialization vector", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Initialization_vector (2016).
[32] \Load order groups for le system lter drivers", URL https:
//msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff549694(v=
vs.85).aspx (2016).
[33] \Number theory", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Number_theory
(2016).
67
[34] \Oauth 2.0", URL http://oauth.net/2/ (2016).
[35] \Pkcs 11", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS_11 (2016).
[36] \Pkcs 7: Cryptographic message syntax", URL https://tools.ietf.org/
html/rfc2315 (2016).
[37] \Rsa (cryptosystem)", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_
(cryptosystem) (2016).
[38] \Sony pictures entertainment", URL http://www.sonypictures.com/ (2016).
[39] \Trusted computing", URL https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_
Computing (2016).
[40] \What is a le system lter driver?", URL https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/windows/hardware/ff557282(v=vs.85).aspx (2016).
[41] \What is a le system lter driver?", URL https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/windows/hardware/ff557282(v=vs.85).aspx (2016).
[42] \Yahoo mail", URL https://overview.mail.yahoo.com/ (2016).
[43] Abrams, M., A Perspective: Data Flow Governance in Asia (2008).
[44] Benameur, S. P., Privacy, Security and Trust Issues Arising from Cloud Com-
puting. (Dec. 2010).
[45] Beveridge, J., \Understanding readdirectorychangesw - part 1",
URL http://qualapps.blogspot.com/2010/05/understanding-
readdirectorychangesw.html (2010).
[46] Brinkman, R., Searching in encrypted data, Ph.D. thesis, URL http://doc.
utwente.nl/57852/ (2007).
[47] Carbin, P., \Intel identity protection technology with public key in-
frastructure", URL https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-
identity-protection-technology-based-token-provider#key (2015).
[48] Carey, P., \Intel beats the street again", URL http://www.mercurynews.com/
business/ci_29385915/intel-beats-street-again (2016).
[49] Charles P. Peeger, S. L. P., Security in Computing, Third Edition, ISBN: 0-13-
035548-8 ( 2003, 1997, 1989 Pearson Education, Inc.., 2015).
[50] Chow, R., P. Golle, M. Jakobsson, E. Shi, J. Staddon, R. Masuoka and J. Molina,
\Controlling data in the cloud: outsourcing computation without outsourcing
control", in \Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing secu-
rity", pp. 85{90 (ACM, 2009).
[51] Dr. Prerna Mahajan, A. S., \A study of encryption algorithms aes, des and rsa
for security", (2016).
68
[52] Esq., K. N. R. and J. M. Tenenbaum, \Sony hack: Costs of cyber attacks and diy
data management", URL http://www.logicworks.net/blog/2015/01/sony-
hack-cloud-hosting-data-security/ (2015).
[53] Haghighat M., Z. S. and A.-M. M., \Cloudid: Trustworthy cloud-based and
cross-enterprise biometric identication", (2015).
[54] Hoekstra, M., URL https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2013/09/26/
protecting-application-secrets-with-intel-sgx (2013).
[55] Hormuzd Khosravi, M. R. D. B., Alex Nayshtut, \Data protection sas v0.4",
(2015).
[56] Hwang, K. and D. Li, \Trusted cloud computing with secure resources and data
coloring", Internet Computing, IEEE 14, 5, 14{22 (2010).
[57] Johnston, S., \"cloud computing" by sam johnston", URL https:
//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cloud_computing.svg#/media/File:
Cloud_computing.svg (2016).
[58] Kessler, G. C., An Overview of Cryptography (2015), URL http://www.
garykessler.net/library/crypto.html#intro.
[59] Khosravi, H., \Intel identity protection technology (ipt)", URL
http://csrc.nist.gov/news_events/cif_2015/trusted-computing/day2_
trusted-computing_430-530.pdf (2015).
[60] kofahi, D. N. A., \An empirical study to compare the performance of some
symmetric and asymmetric ciphers", International Journal of Security and Its
Applications 7, 5, 1{16 (2013).
[61] Krishnan, K., \Sfwr 4c03: Computer networks and computer security",
URL http://www4.ncsu.edu/~kksivara/sfwr4c03/lectures/lecture9.pdf
(2011).
[62] Krutz, R. L. and R. D. Vines, Cloud Security: A Comprehensive Guide to Secure
Cloud Computing (Wiley Publishing, 2010).
[63] Kumar, S. N. and A. Vajpayee, \A survey on secure cloud: Security and privacy
in cloud computing", American Journal of Systems and Software 4, 1, 14{26
(2016).
[64] Lipmaa, H., D. Wagner and P. Rogaway, \Comments to nist concerning aes
modes of operation: Ctr-mode encryption", (2000).
[65] Mell, P. and T. Grance, \The nist denition of cloud computing", (2011).
[66] Nate Cardozo, R. R., Kurt Opsahl, \Online service providersprivacy and trans-
parency practices regarding government access to user data", Tech. rep., Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (2015).
69
[67] Rijswijk-Deij, R. and E. Poll, \Using trusted execution environments in two-
factor authentication: comparing approaches", (2013).
[68] Ruan, X., Intel Identity Protection Technology: the Robust, Convenient, and
Cost-Eective Way to Deter Identity Theft (Springer, 2014).
[69] Shen, Z. and Q. Tong, \The security of cloud computing system enabled by
trusted computing technology", in \Signal Processing Systems (ICSPS), 2010
2nd International Conference on", vol. 2, pp. V2{11 (IEEE, 2010).
[70] Siegler, M., \Eric schmidt: Every 2 days we create as much information as we
did up to 2003", URL "http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/04/schmidt-data/"
(2010).
[71] Solomon, M. G., Fundamentals of Communications and Networking (Johns and
Bartlett Learning, 2014).
[72] Sta, C., URL http://www.cio.com/article/3014617/security/data-
breaches-will-affect-25-percent-of-worlds-population-by-2020-idc-
predicts.html#tk.rss_all (2015).
[73] Subashini, S. and V. Kavitha, \A survey on security issues in service delivery
models of cloud computing", Journal of network and computer applications 34,
1, 1{11 (2011).
[74] Zissis, D. and D. Lekkas, \Addressing cloud computing security issues", Future
Generation computer systems 28, 3, 583{592 (2012).
70
